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Abstract
Using an estimated life-cycle model, we quantify the role of heterogeneity in wealth 
returns for the response of income to marginal tax changes. In our economy, agents who 
are suffi ciently productive can obtain higher returns by choosing to be entrepreneurs. 
Return heterogeneity amplifi es the responsiveness of total income to marginal tax 
changes along the entire income distribution with the top 1 percent displaying the highest 
elasticities. Return heterogeneity increases the incentives to invest for the richest, high-
return entrepreneurs, thus amplifying their income responses to marginal tax changes. 
This reallocation of capital increases aggregate productivity, generating a larger boost 
in equilibrium wages. This in turn strengthens the income response of the bottom 90 
percent, but nevertheless, their response is smaller than at the top.
Keywords: risky investment, elasticity of taxable income, life-cycle, entrepreneurs, 
structural estimation.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H21, H24.
Resumen
Este trabajo utiliza un modelo de ciclo de vida para cuantifi car el rol de la heterogeneidad 
en los rendimientos de las inversiones en la respuesta económica de unos cambios 
impositivos marginales. En este modelo, los agentes que son sufi cientemente productivos 
pueden obtener rendimientos más altos si eligen ser empresarios. La heterogeneidad en 
los rendimientos amplifi ca la respuesta de los ingresos totales a los cambios impositivos 
marginales sobre toda la distribución del ingreso. El 1 % más rico muestra las 
elasticidades más altas. La heterogeneidad de retorno aumenta los incentivos a invertir 
para los empresarios más ricos y de alto rendimiento, amplifi cando así sus respuestas 
de ingresos a los cambios del impuesto marginal. Esta reasignación de capital aumenta 
la productividad agregada, generando un mayor impulso en los salarios de equilibrio. 
Esto, a su vez, fortalece la respuesta del ingreso del 90 % más pobre, pero, sin embargo, 
su respuesta es menor que en la parte superior de la distribución.
Palabras clave: inversión de alto riesgo, elasticidad de la renta imponible, modelos de 
ciclo de vida, empresarios, estimación estructural.
Códigos JEL: E62, H21, H24.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of investment risk, in the form of capital return heterogene-
ity, for the transmission of marginal tax changes in the US. There are at least two reasons
that make this analysis important for a sound evaluation of fiscal policies. First, capital
income heterogeneity is a robust feature of the empirical evidence on investment return
risk (e.g., Smith et al., 2019; Fagereng et al., 2020; Bach et al., 2020). Second, modeling
investment return heterogeneity has been shown to be pivotal in explaining income and
wealth inequality and their dynamics (e.g., Benhabib et al., 2011; Gabaix et al., 2016;
Benhabib et al., 2019).
We quantify the effect of marginal tax policies in a model where households face
persistent heterogeneity in returns on their wealth. In our economy, agents can obtain
higher-than-average returns by choosing to be entrepreneurs, but only if they are suffi-
ciently productive. We integrate our model of entrepreneurs into an otherwise standard
life-cycle framework with incomplete markets, uninsurable labor income risk and progres-
sive income taxes. We estimate our model to capture the right tail of the income and
wealth distribution, in conjunction with a broader set of distributional and macroeco-
nomic moments. As such, we present a suitable laboratory to study the long-run effects
of marginal income tax changes.
We find that return heterogeneity amplifies the responsiveness of total income (capital
and labor) to marginal tax changes, particularly for incomes in the top 1 percent. While
the effect is also substantial for the bottom 90 percent, return heterogeneity alters the
distributional impact of tax policy, so that it is the top 1 percent who are most responsive.
With return heterogeneity, a cut in marginal tax rates increases the incentive to save,
but mainly for high-return entrepreneurs in the top of the income distribution. This
reallocation of capital to high-productivity agents increases aggregate productivity and
generates a larger equilibrium boost in wages, in turn benefitting also the bottom 90
percent.
In our main quantitative experiment, we evaluate a reform which changes the marginal
income tax rate for all taxpayers. We focus on the long-run elasticity of total taxable
income with respect to net-of-tax rates (1 minus the marginal tax rate) – i.e., the elasticity
of taxable income (ETI). The ETI (or policy elasticity in the sense of Hendren, 2016)
measures the distortionary effects of taxation by incorporating the behavioral responses
of labor supply, investment, as well as equilibrium changes in prices. The ETI is a popular
measure in public finance because, under some regularity conditions, it is a sufficient
statistic to evaluate the efficiency costs of tax policy reforms (e.g., Saez et al., 2012).
We show that capital return heterogeneity amplifies the ETI of the overall economy
by around 34 percent (i.e., from 0.49 to 0.66).1 For the top 1 percent, the ETI is more
1In our framework, this implies an increase from 23.8 percent to 28.5 percent for the fraction of
additional tax revenue lost through behavioral responses.
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than doubled (i.e., from 0.37 to 0.77), while for the bottom 90 percent, the ETI increases
by 19 percent (i.e., from 0.59 to 0.70). In contrast, in standard models without return
heterogeneity, or in models which match the fat tail of the wealth distribution through
a superstar earnings state (e.g., Kindermann and Krueger, 2020; Brüggemann, 2020),
incomes at the top are less elastic to marginal tax changes. Furthermore, our results for
the long-run are similar to the short-run results presented in Mertens and Montiel Olea
(2018). In our case, however, higher responses at the top do not reflect any tax avoidance
or intertemporal substitution from transitory changes in tax policy, relying instead on the
incentives of high-return individuals to adjust their investment.
By evaluating the importance of return heterogeneity, we provide novel insights about
the transmission mechanism of marginal income tax policies. In this regard, our structural
approach allows us to fully control for how return heterogeneity affects the transmission
of fiscal policies through individual behavior (labor supply/investment) and general equi-
librium price changes. Our paper shows that return heterogeneity is both quantitatively
and qualitatively important for the transmission of marginal tax changes, especially for
incomes in the top 1 percent. Therefore, capturing these fiscal spillovers is crucial for
policy analysis in practice.
Moreover, we estimate the long-run effects of marginal tax changes, while the empirical
literature concentrates on short- to medium-run effects (e.g., Barro and Redlick, 2011;
Romer and Romer, 2014; Mertens and Montiel Olea, 2018). This is mainly because
estimates of the effects of marginal tax changes in the long-run (i.e., exceeding a few
years) are plagued by extremely difficult issues of identification (e.g. Saez et al., 2012).
For instance, the effects of a tax reform on capital income and entrepreneurial productivity
may not be reached for several years and hence they are very difficult to trace back
empirically to the original policy change. However, exactly for the prolonged adjustments
and spillovers that follow a marginal tax change, these long-run effects are of great interest
to policy-makers. We get around the identification problem by simulating the long-run
effects of fiscal policy change within an estimated life-cycle model. From a quantitative
point of view, while there are no truly convincing estimates of long-run ETI, the best
available estimates cited in Saez et al. (2012) are in the range of 0.12 to 0.40. Interestingly,
our estimates indicate a larger ETI.
One possible drawback of our approach is that our estimates are conditional on the
assumed data generation process. While our model contains several important ingredients
and heterogeneity over various dimensions, it almost surely misses on some features that
could have a sizeable impact on the transmission of marginal tax changes. For example,
we do not include human capital accumulation nor tax avoidance. These factors are
naturally expected to increase the interplay between capital return heterogeneity and the
distortionary effects marginal tax rates. Thus, we expect that these extra ingredients
could further magnify the quantitative importance of our results. However, we leave such
an analysis for future research.
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Our paper is related to the literature that models uninsurable capital income risk
within life-cycle heterogeneous-agent frameworks (e.g., Benhabib et al., 2011; Guvenen
et al., 2019). This modeling feature has recently gained popularity for three reasons.
First, the empirical evidence shows a substantial heterogeneity in capital income (Bach
et al., 2020; Fagereng et al., 2020). Second, heterogeneity in capital income is a crucial
ingredient in order to match the fat Pareto tail of the wealth distribution. Third, capital
return heterogeneity has been shown to have important consequences for the setting of
economic policies (e.g., Guvenen et al., 2019). Our contribution is to show that hetero-
geneity in capital income greatly modifies our understanding of the ETI along the income
distribution, causing the top 1 percent to display the largest elasticities in the long-run.
Another strand of literature links aggregate productivity, entrepreneurship and taxes.
In a growth model with entrepreneurs, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2017) find higher capital
income tax rates reduce incentives to be entrepreneurs and long-run growth. Guvenen
et al. (2019) find that a wealth tax reduces misallocation and increases aggregate TFP by
re-allocating capital toward more productive entrepreneurs. Differently, we focus on the
effect of progressive income taxes on entrepreneurship and productivity when capital and
labor are jointly taxed. Moreover, our paper offers support within a structural approach,
to a number of well established empirical results, such as the relation between tax rates
and entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Djankov et al., 2010), the effects of tax changes on
aggregate productivity (e.g., Cloyne, 2013) and the relationship between tax progressivity
and misallocation (e.g., Fajgelbaum et al., 2019).
Our paper is also related to the literature that uses quantitative incomplete-markets
life-cycle models as a laboratory to evaluate fiscal reforms (e.g., Nishiyama and Smetters,
2005; Guner et al., 2012; Chang and Park, 2020). Our focus, however, is on the importance
of return heterogeneity for the long-run consequences of marginal tax changes. Moreover,
several recent papers focus on the optimal tax rate for the top 1 percent (e.g., Badel et al.,
2020; Kindermann and Krueger, 2020; Brüggemann, 2020). Since tax reforms frequently
affect most (if not all) taxpayers rather than just the top 1 percent, we instead focus
on tax changes which affect marginal tax rates along the whole distribution of income.2
Furthermore, in contrast to these papers, we focus on a different mechanism (return
heterogeneity) rather than human capital accumulation or a superstar state, and show
that it has major implications for elasticities at the top.
Lastly, we relate to the literature on capital misallocation featuring financially con-
strained entrepreneurs with heterogeneous productivity (e.g., Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006;
Moll, 2014; Itskhoki and Moll, 2019). On this aspect, the closest contribution is Guvenen
et al. (2019), who analyze the effects of fiscal reforms, in particular a shift from capital in-
come to wealth taxes, on capital misallocation. Instead, we focus on how marginal income
tax changes affect aggregate productivity, via changes in the rate of entrepreneurship.
2For instance, see the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which changed the
marginal tax rates for most income brackets.
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The reminder of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents our benchmark struc-
tural model. Section 3 describes the main estimation exercise. Section 4 presents the
main policy experiment. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We present an incomplete-markets life-cycle model with idiosyncratic risk in both labor
and capital income. The economy is populated by households who decide on consump-
tion, saving, labor supply and whether or not to engage in entrepreneurial activity. The
government taxes income, chooses public spending and provides social security benefits
for retirement.
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, who differ by type i ∈
{1, . . . , I} and age j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Each period, a mass of new households is born, where
the rate of population growth is assumed to be n. At birth, each household learns its
innate talent, indexed by i, which determines its overall level of labor productivity. We
denote by πi the probability that a household will be type i.
During their life, households choose consumption, savings, and labor supply and
3Naturally, s1 = 1 and sJ+1 = 0.
4The measure μj can be defined recursively, where μj+1 = sj+1μj/ (1 + n) for j = 1, . . . , J − 1 and μ1
is set to normalize
∑J
j=1 μj = 1.
whether or not to engage in entrepreneurial activity, given idiosyncratic risk in capital
and labor income. Households also pay progressive income taxes and flat social security
taxes on labor earnings (up to a cap). After retirement at age R, households receive social
security benefits from the government.
Households also face a risk of early death. We denote by sj the probability of surviving
to age j, conditional on surviving to age j − 1.3 The demographic patterns are stable,
so that age-j agents make up a constant fraction μj of the total population.
4 Accidental
bequests are redistributed to all living consumers as a lump-sum transfer, Tb.
Preferences. All agents have identical preferences for consumption cj and hours worked
















k=1 sk is the unconditional probability an age-1 agent will survive to age j. As it
is standard in the literature (e.g., Conesa et al., 2009), we assume that the period utility
is of the form
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where γ is the consumption utility share and σ controls the household’s risk aversion.
2.2 Labor Earnings Risk
In each period before retirement, agents receive labor earnings equal to weh, where
w is the real wage rate, e is the household’s labor ability and h is hours worked. When
households reach age R, they retire so that hours worked and total labor earnings become
zero for ages j ≥ R.
We assume ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity in labor abilities as in, inter alia, Kaplan





A household’s labor productivity depends on three factors. First, labor ability depends
on a household-specific innate ability, ēi. At birth, the household learns her type i ∈
y
log ei,j(zh) = ēi + α0 + α1j + α2j
2 + α3j
3 + α4j
4 + log zh (2)
{1, . . . , I} which indexes its overall level of labor ability. We denote by πi the probability
a household will become type i. Second, labor ability explicitly depends on a fourth-order
polynomial in age j. Third, labor ability is also affected by an idiosyncratic shock, zh,
which follows an AR(1) process:





where the initial log zh is set to zero.
In our quantitative analysis, we parameterize the innate abilities {ēi}Ii=1 and the type
probabilities {πi}Ii=1 using one parameter: the standard deviation of innate labor ability,
σe. First, given σe, we set {ēi}Ii=1 as I individual points, linearly spaced between −3σe
and +3σe. Second, assuming innate labor ability is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2e , we construct the individual probabilities {πi}Ii=1 using the approximation
method of Tauchen (1986).
2.3 Asset Return Risk
Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Guvenen et al. (2019), we introduce a
role for entrepreneurship. All households can choose to be an entrepreneur, whereby
they access a “backyard technology” that uses k units of capital to produce q units of an
intermediate capital service. We assume a linear technology
q = zrk (4)
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where zr can be interpreted as the household’s entrepreneurial productivity.
We assume that entrepreneurial productivity follows an AR(1) process:





where the initial shock is drawn from the distribution N (0, σ2εr/(1− ρ2r)).5 The interme-
diate capital service is then sold at the price p in a perfectly competitive market to the
final goods producer, where it is used (along with labor) to produce the uniform final
good Y (see Section 2.4 below).
All households lend on the bond market their whole wealth at the riskless rate r. Those
who also choose to be entrepreneurs borrow at rate r on the same market and use their
5In our quantitative analysis, we will technically assume that zr is bounded by zr,min and zr,max.
6Specifically, with decreasing returns to scale, a household would earn a lower rate of return when its
wealth is higher. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, wealthier households would earn higher returns.
own backyard technology to produce the intermediate capital service q. Entrepreneurs
must also decide how much capital k to invest in their backyard technology. They are
subject to a collateral constraint (k ≤ λa), where λ ≥ 1 is exogenous and controls the
leverage level, while a is the individual entrepreneur’s wealth (e.g., see Moll, 2014, Boar
and Midrigan, 2019 and Guvenen et al., 2019). Entrepreneurs then maximize the following
profit function,
π(a, zr) = max
0≤k≤λa
{pzrk − (r + δ)k} , (6)
where r + δ is the rental rate of capital, with δ representing the depreciation rate. The
associated optimal capital demand is
k(a, zr) =
{
λa if zr ≥ (r + δ)/p
0 if zr < (r + δ)/p
(7)
Therefore, there exists an endogenous productivity threshold,
z̄r = (r + δ)/p, (8)
such that only households that are sufficiently productive will choose to be entrepreneurs,
while the others will simply engage in lending activities.
In our framework with constant returns to scale, only a fraction of households will
decide to become entrepreneurs, via an endogenous productivity cutoff, see equation (8)
above. This allows the model to match the entrepreneurship rate observed in the data and
also avoids the negative relationship between wealth and returns, which is counterfactual
(e.g., see Bach et al., 2020).6
To summarize, all households earn r by lending their wealth on the bond market.
Those households with sufficiently high entrepreneurial ability also choose to run a busi-
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ness, whereby they borrow at rate r, produce the intermediate good q and earn π(a, zr).
Substituting the solution for π(a, zr), the household’s total return on its wealth is given
by
Therefore, there will be persistent idiosyncratic variation in returns across households,
which is a crucial ingredient for the model’s ability to match the fat tail of wealth (e.g.,
see Benhabib et al., 2011, Benhabib et al., 2019 and Guvenen et al., 2019). Furthermore,
ra(zr) = r + λmax (pzr − (r + δ), 0) . (9)
despite no explicit link between wealth and returns, high-wealth households will, on av-
erage, earn higher returns, consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g., see Bach et al.,
2020 and Fagereng et al., 2020).
2.4 Production Technology
The final good is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = F (Q,L) = QαL1−α
where L is aggregate labor and Q is the aggregate of the intermediate capital good pro-
duced by entrepreneurs.
It is straightforward to derive the following aggregate relationship:
Y = AKαL1−α
where K is aggregate capital and A is aggregate TFP. Aggregate TFP is A = (Q/K)α,
where Q/K is the average productivity of entrepreneurs. Therefore, aggregate productiv-
ity depends crucially on the allocation of capital across entrepreneurs.
The market for the intermediate good and the market for labor are both perfectly
competitive. Therefore, the representative firm takes as given the prices (w, p) and chooses
Q and L to maximize profits, Π = QαL1−α − pQ− wL.
2.5 Government
The government taxes income in order to finance a fixed and exogenous level of govern-
ment spending, G, which provides agents no utility. The government operates a balanced
budget and does not use debt, implying that G is just equal to aggregate income tax
revenue, Ty. The government also runs a social security system with a dedicated budget.
2.5.1 Income Tax
Labor and capital income are jointly taxable. Households can deduct part of the social
security contribution, up to an upper limit ȳ. The household’s taxable income is






min (wei,j(zh)h, ȳ) , 0
)
(10)
We impose that taxable income must be non-negative because, in principle, the asset
return could be negative if the equilibrium lending rate r is negative.7 We adopt a tax
specification function belonging to a flexible three-parameter family, originally proposed
by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and popular in applied works (e.g., Conesa et al., 2009
and Guner et al., 2014),
Ty(y) = τ0y
(
1− (τ2yτ1 + 1)−1/τ1
)
. (11)
Roughly speaking, τ0 governs the maximum tax rate, while τ1 and τ2 determine the
progressivity of the tax schedule. For τ1 → 0, the tax system reduces to a pure flat tax,
while other values encompass a wide range of progressive and regressive tax functions.
According to this specification, the marginal income tax rate converges to zero as taxable
income converges to zero, while the marginal tax rate converges to the upper bound of τ0
as taxable income grows large.
2.5.2 Social Security Scheme
The government runs a pay-as-you-go social security scheme. Taxpayers pay a social
security tax only out of their labor income (at the flat tax rate τss), up to an upper bound
ȳ. The government pays a type-specific social security benefit, bi,j:
bi,j =
{
0 if j < R
b̄i if j ≥ R.
We assume that b̄i = χwLi, where Li is the average labor input of type-i agents and χ is
the replacement rate.
Social security benefits are financed by a flat tax τss on all labor earnings weh be-
low ȳ. That is, a household with labor earnings weh will pay a social security tax of
τss min (weh, ȳ). Given the tax rate τss and the cap ȳ, we internally set the replace-
ment rate χ so that aggregate social security tax revenue equals aggregate social security
benefits.
2.6 Value Function
Having presented the main features of our model economy, we can now describe the
household’s problem in recursive form. In each period, the household chooses consumption
7Nevertheless, the equilibrium rate r is positive in our analysis.
c, savings a′, and labor supply h given idiosyncratic risk, the sequence of prices and the
tax function. In retirement, households supply zero hours (i.e., h = 0), but they still
choose consumption and savings. Let Vi,j(a, zh, zr) denote the value of a type-i and age-j
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Vi,j(a, zh, zr) = max
c,h,a′







min (wei,j(zh)h, ȳ) , 0
)
c+ a′ = a(1 + ra(zr)) + wei,j(zh)h− τss min (wei,j(zh)h, ȳ)− Ty(y) + Tb + bi,j
a′ ≥ 0
0 ≤ h ≤ 1{j < R}.
2.7 Equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium, in which capital, labor, transfers and government
consumption are all constant in per-capita terms. See Appendix A for a full definition.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we outline our estimation strategy, and then evaluate the model’s ability
to account for a number of features in the data for the US. We solve and estimate the
model assuming the economy is in a steady state. One period corresponds to one year
and we convert all nominal values into 2010 dollars. We refer the reader to Appendix B
for a detailed description of the numerical strategy used for solving the model.
We split our parameters into two main groups: (i) a group of parameters that is
externally set, either according to previous literature, via direct observation or through
estimation; and (ii) a group of parameters that is internally set, either through calibration
on aggregate macroeconomic statistics, or estimated by using a Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM) estimator, in order to match relevant distributional moments in the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 2016.
consumer with assets a and idiosyncratic shocks (zh, zr). We can write the consumer’s
maximization problem as follows:
3.1 Externally Set Parameters
Externally Fixed Parameters We fix two parameters consistently with the literature
(see panel A, Table 1). The first of these is σ, which controls households’ risk aversion.
We fix this parameter to 2, consistent with a large bulk of applied works in the life-cycle
literature (e.g., Nishiyama and Smetters, 2005 and Benhabib et al., 2019).8 Second, we fix
the capital income share α, to 0.36, which is standard in the macroeconomics literature.
8Given the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the coefficient of relative risk aversion in
consumption is −cucc/uc = 1− γ (1− σ).
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Then, we fix J , the maximum age in the model, to 85 and R, the retirement age, to 45.
Assuming that age 1 in the model corresponds to age 21 in the real life, these choices for
(J,R) correspond to ages 105 and 65 in real life/years. We set the population growth rate
n to 0.7%, to be consistent with the U.S. population growth rate in the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. We obtained estimates of the survival probabilities sj
from the United States Mortality Database (see Appendix C for details). Finally, we
use data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to set the linear social security tax,
τss = 12.4%, and the upper limit on the social security contribution, ȳ = 107.7k.
Externally Estimated Parameters Next, we focus on a set of parameters that we
estimate outside the model (see panel B, Table 1). We estimate the parameters of the tax
functions (τ0, τ1, τ2) via a non-linear weighted least squares method (e.g., Guner et al.,
2014). Using our SCF data, we construct a measure of income that includes all income
flowing to households. We then calculate federal income tax liabilities using NBER’s
TAXSIM program. See Appendix D for details. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting tax
function.
One important drawback of our analysis is that we consider a tax function for total
income, where the tax authority does not discriminate between labor and capital income.
This is mainly due to data limitation, as in microeconomic surveys like the SCF there
is not a clear way to estimate distinct tax functions for labor and capital income. For
this reason, our approach is standard in the empirical public finance literature, where
the elasticity of taxable income generally utilizes a broad definition of the tax base (e.g.,
Saez et al., 2012 and Mertens and Montiel Olea, 2018). However, in reality, the US
tax authority taxes differently at least part of income based on its origin (i.e., labor or
capital). Our main results follow through in the alternative scenario where labor and
capital incomes are taxed differently, with a progressive tax on earnings and a linear tax
on capital income (see Appendix H for details).
Next, we need to face one of the biggest challenges of our quantitative exercise: the
estimation of the labor ability process in (2). On the one hand, this type of fixed effect
models would conform very well with the panel dimension of PSID. The problem with
this approach is that the labor earnings inequality recorded in PSID is much lower than
that observed on SCF and other inequality measures–e.g., the Gini coefficient is more
than 10 percentage points lower in PSID than in SCF. As such, by using this method, one
would lose on a fundamental aspect of inequality, particularly for the top 1 percent of the
distribution. Alternatively, one could only use SCF, which is more reliable for measuring
earnings at the top of the distribution. The fundamental issue with this dataset is that
it lacks of a panel dimension, and so it would be very difficult to credibly estimate, for
instance, dynamic features of the transitory idiosyncratic risk in (3).
We tackle these issues by adopting a hybrid approach between the two datasets. In
particular, we start by estimating the parameters of the fourth order age-profile (α1, α2,
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Figure 1 – Tax Function















A. Average Tax Rate
Top 1%
Median
















B. Marginal Tax Rate
Top 1%
Median
Note: We estimate an income tax function using a measure of total income in the SCF and a measure of
federal tax liabilities from NBER’s TAXSIM. Taxable income is expressed in 2010 dollars.
α3, α4) directly on SCF. Then, following the approach of Kaplan (2012), we recollect the
process of transitory idiosyncratic risk by estimating a fixed effect model on PSID (see
Appendix E for details). This method allows to exploit the panel dimension of PSID and
Table 1 – Externally Set Parameters
Parameters Notation Value Std. Err. Source
A: Fixed Parameters
Risk Aversion σ 2 Typical in lit.
Capital Share α 0.36 Typical in lit.
Maximum Age J 85 Corresp. to age 105
Retirement Age R 45 Corresp. to age 65
Survival Prob. sj Appendix C USMD
Pop. Growth n 0.007 World Bank
Soc. Sec. Tax τss 0.124 IRS
Soc. Sec. Cap ȳ 107.7 IRS
B: Estimated Parameters
Maximal Tax Rate τ0 0.278 (0.003) SCF/TAXSIM
Tax Progressivity 1 τ1 2.84 (0.10) SCF/TAXSIM
Tax Progressivity 2 τ2 1.14e
−5 (4.03e−6) SCF/TAXSIM
Ability Coef. 1 α1 0.100 (0.014) SCF
Ability Coef. 2 α2 −3.72e−3 (1.19e−3) SCF
Ability Coef. 3 α3 6.37e
−5 (3.87e−5) SCF
Ability Coef. 4 α4 −4.20e−7 (4.24e−7) SCF
Labor Ability Persist. ρh 0.976 (0.005) PSID
Labor Ability Std. Dev. σεh 0.135 (0.006) PSID
Note: This table reports the externally set parameters. USMD stands for the United States Mortality
Database. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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process of the transitory component of labor abilities (e.g., Guvenen et al., 2019). The
remaining two parameters of the ability process, σe and α0 will be internally set using
data from the SCF (see the discussion below).
3.2 Internally Set Parameters
Internally Calibrated Parameters We now report the calibrated parameters in Ta-
ble 2. We set the discount factor, β, and the parameter governing the exogenous collateral
constraint on the leverage level, λ, to target (i) an average wealth-to-output ratio (K/Y )
of 2.95, which is the average post-1980 capital-to-output ratio as reported by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA); and (ii) return on safe assets (r in the model) of 1.9 percent,
a value consistent with the post-1980 average US safe real return on Bills (see Jordà et al.,
2019). Furthermore, we set the capital depreciation rate, δ, to 0.05, so that the ratio of
investment and durables investment to GDP is 22 percent, consistent with the post-1980
9As discussed in Section 2.2, we use σe to parameterize the fixed effects {ēi}Ii=1 and the type-
probabilities {πi}Ii=1. We use I = 6 types.
10
Table 2 – Calibrated Parameters and Targeted Moments
Parameters Notation Value Target
Discount Factor β 0.989 Wealth-to-output ratio
Coll. Constraint λ 3.04 Risk-free borrowing rate
Depreciation Rate δ 0.05 Investment-to-output ratio
Soc. Sec. Benefit χ 0.305 Balanced budget
Moments Model Data Source
Capital-to-output Ratio 2.95 2.95 BEA
Investment-to-output Ratio 0.22 0.22 BEA
Borrowing Rate 0.019 0.019 Jordà et al. (2019)
Note: This table reports the calibrated parameters and associated targets. The social security benefit,
χ, is internally set so that the government runs a balanced budget rule, where aggregate social security
tax revenue equals aggregate social security benefits.
US average in the BEA NIPA tables. Finally, we internally set the social security benefit,
χ, so that the public pension system runs a balanced budget rule.
Internally Estimated Parameters The five parameters that remain to be set are
(γ, σe, α0, ρr, σεr). The preference parameter γ governs the utility weight of consumption.
The parameter σe is the standard deviation of permanent labor ability.
9 The parameter
α0 is the constant term in the ability profile. Finally, (ρr, σεr) govern the capital income
risk faced by individuals.
estimate a persistence component, ρh = 0.972, and a standard deviation σεh = 0.135.
Interestingly, these numbers are similar to the large body of literature estimating the
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We use SMM to estimate these parameters by minimizing the distance between model
statistics and their empirical counterparts. In particular, denoting the vector of param-









M̂ − m̂ (Θ)
)
,
where M̂ identifies the targeted moments from the SCF, m̂(Θ) represents the moments
implied by the model for a given set of parameters Θ, and W is a weighting matrix.10
10We freely picked the weighting matrix W . In particular, we assumed the off-diagonal elements are
all zero. For the diagonal elements, we assume Wii = 1/M̂
2
i , where M̂i is data moment i.
Table 3 – Estimated Parameters and Targeted Moments
Parameters Notation Value Std. Err.
Utility Cons. Weight γ 0.362 (0.004)
Labor Ability PC σe 0.985 (0.023)
Labor Ability Constant α0 2.741 (0.043)
Return Persistence ρr 0.968 (0.004)
Return Shock σεr 0.172 (0.004)
Moments Model Data
Average Hours (working age) 0.299 0.304
Entrepreneurship Rate 0.087 0.085
Wealth Gini 0.862 0.860
Wealth Share, Top 1% 0.406 0.386
Wealth Share, Top 5% 0.638 0.651
Wealth Share, Top 20% 0.888 0.883
Earnings Gini 0.735 0.680
Earnings Share, Top 1% 0.145 0.172
Earnings Share, Top 5% 0.363 0.327
Earnings Share, Top 20% 0.687 0.605
Average Earnings 54.83 55.30
Revenues Tax Share, Top 1% 0.419 0.424
Revenues Tax Share, Top 5% 0.702 0.659
Revenues Tax Share, Top 20% 0.959 0.881
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 20% 1.574 1.638
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 40% 0.915 0.959
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 60% 0.693 0.717
Note: The top panel reports the estimated parameters with standard errors, while the bottom panel
reports the moments in the model and the data. The model parameters are estimated via Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) using moments from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Standard errors are computed via
√
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where N represents the number of observations, the matrix G is the gradient matrix of the
moments, S is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the moments and ω = Ns/N
is the ratio of the number of observations in the simulation relative to the data.
The estimated parameters are reported in the top panel of Table 3, while the mo-
ments are reported in bottom panel. We should highlight two main results from the
estimation exercise. First, all parameters are statistically different than zero and pre-
cisely estimated. This finding is not obvious and shows a tight link between targeted
moments and structural parameters. As such, this result brings favorable evidence to our
identification strategy. Second, the model does very well matching the moments from
the SCF. Our model matches the wealth gini and the wealth shares of the top 1, 5 ad
20 percent, respectively. Similarly, it matches the right tail in the distribution of taxable
income and earnings. Interestingly, our model also captures the wealth-income slope,
average hours worked, the entrepreneurial rate as well as average earnings. Finally, while
they are not explicit targeted moments, our model is also able to replicate the capital
income shares reported by Piketty et al. (2018) and Saez and Zucman (2020) for the
richest income groups (top 1 and 10 percent) as well as for the economy as a whole (see
panel D, Table 4).
Our model is also successful in generating the fat Pareto tails of the taxable income
and wealth distributions observed in the data (see Figure 2). As shown in Benhabib et al.
(2011), Benhabib et al. (2019) and Guvenen et al. (2019), the key ingredient to generate
realistic unequal economies within life-cycle models is the presence of return heterogeneity.
For this reason, the estimation of the two parameters governing entrepreneurial idiosyn-
















Pareto Tail, Taxable Income
Model
Data


















Note: This figure plots the complimentary cumulative distribution of taxable income and wealth, in the
model and the data (SCF).
Figure 2 – Fat Tail: Model vs. Data
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cratic productivity (ρr and σεr) is crucial for matching the distributions of wealth and
















Note: This figure plots the average asset returns by wealth percentile, as generated by the model in 2016.
Average returns by wealth percentiles: top 1 percent, 7.14 percent; top 5 percent, 4.57 percent; top 10
percent, 3.93 percent; bottom 99 percent, 2.44 percent; bottom 90 percent, 2.32 percent.
Figure 3 – Average Returns in Benchmark Model
taxable income, the wealth-income slope and the share of entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
the estimation of the utility parameter γ is useful for matching average hours of labor
supply, while the two parameters of the labor ability process are important to match the
average earnings (α0) and earnings inequality (σe).
One obvious concern is to what extent the return heterogeneity necessary to cap-
ture distributional moments is consistent with the empirical evidence on wealth returns.
Figure 3 plots the wealth returns implied by the model by wealth percentile. First, qual-
itatively, our model captures the positive correlation between wealth and returns. The
mechanism behind this result is clear: agents (entrepreneurs) enjoying high productiv-
ity in capital income have an incentive to accumulate large wealth. Interestingly, the
wealth-return becomes significantly steeper for the very top percentiles of the wealth dis-
tribution (i.e., above the 95th percentile). This is a key feature in order to obtain large
wealth shares for the wealthiest top 1 and 5 percent of the distribution. This qualitative
aspect about the correlation between returns and wealth size is a robust feature of recent
empirical studies (e.g., Benhabib et al., 2019; Fagereng et al., 2020; Bach et al., 2020).
Second, quantitatively, our model produces returns around or slightly above the risk
free rate (between 2 and 4 percent) for most of the population and returns around 7.1
percent for wealthiest one percent. Comparing our model-based return profiles with the
data is problematic. On the one hand, US-based data in the SCF lacks of a long-span
panel dimension, and therefore one cannot fully measure for the entirety of wealth returns
such as unrealized capital gains. On the other hand, countries that provide panel data
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dimension on wealth returns (e.g., Norway), show that the portfolio composition of wealth
(particularly at the top of the distribution) is quite different than in the US.11
To partly overcome these issues, in Appendix F, we compute returns by wealth per-
centile in the SCF, by adopting the technique proposed in Xavier (2020). Briefly, this
consists of estimating the return for each household’s portfolio in the SCF using outside
estimates of the return on individual asset types. First, the data display the same qual-
itative patterns as that of our model: households with higher wealth obtain higher than
average returns. Second, the consistency of our model-implied returns at the bottom 25
percent of the wealth distribution and, critically, in the top 1 percent is striking, while the
imputed returns from the SCF seem to be higher than those implied by the model in the
middle of the wealth distribution. Overall these results (particularly for the consistency
at the top of the wealth distribution) confirm the ability of our model to provide a realistic
explanation of the fat tail in wealth and income distributions.
4 Tax Policy and Return Heterogeneity
We use our structural model to analyze the long-run distortionary effects of a change
in marginal income tax rates. The main policy experiment that we consider is a change in
τ0, assuming that government spending adjusts accordingly in the long-run. This type of
tax changes mimics various policy reforms implemented by the US federal government and
affects the marginal tax rates of all income groups. In this sense, our policy experiment
differs from Guner et al. (2016), Kindermann and Krueger (2020) and Badel et al. (2020),
who instead focus on the effects of changing taxes for the top 1 percent of the income
distribution.12
ETI and Policy Elasticity We analyze the effects of our tax change by computing
the elasticity of taxable income (y) with respect to net-of-tax rates (1 minus the average
11For example, according to Fagereng et al. (2020), in Norway, the share of housing in gross wealth
held by the 95-99 percentiles (99-99.9 percentiles) is 0.73 (0.44). Meanwhile, it is only 0.33 (0.25) in the
US (as reported in the 2016 SCF).
12In Appendix I, we analyze the effect of a reform which increases marginal tax rates only for the
top 1 percent. In this scenario, we obtain similar results with respect to the effect of heterogeneous
returns, but marginal tax changes are more distortionary. In this sense, the exercise presented here is
more conservative from a quantitative point of view.
marginal tax rate) in the long-run:
This measure can also be interpreted as a policy elasticity in the sense of Hendren (2016).
As described in Saez et al. (2012), in settings without fiscal externalities and income
shifting, like the one under consideration here, the ETI represents a sufficient statistic to
ETI =
d ln y
d ln(1− AMTR) .
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evaluate the efficiency effects of a tax change. As such, it is a fundamental measure for
policy analysis.
First, we study how the ETI varies for different income sources (i.e., capital and labor),
and how it varies along the age and income distribution. Second, we study the aggregate
implications of tax policies, particularly for prices, aggregate productivity and misallo-
cation. In order to isolate the role of return heterogeneity, we compare our benchmark
economy with one where capital return is constant.13
4.1 Effects of a Tax Change
We consider our main policy experiment, where we change τ0 by a small amount. This
change will affect the marginal income tax rate for all taxpayers.
Elasticities by Income In Table 4, we report the results for our main policy exper-
iment, both in the benchmark economy and the alternative model without return het-
erogeneity. The main result from this exercise is that return heterogeneity substantially
affects the transmission mechanism of marginal tax policies. From a quantitative point of
view, return heterogeneity increases the overall ETI from 0.49 to 0.66 (i.e., by 34 percent).
This effect is strongest for the top 1 percent of the income distribution, but it is also high
for the bottom 90 percent, with the smallest increase accruing to the bottom 99 percent.
As a result, our benchmark economy exhibits a U-shaped relationship between the ETI
and income, with the top 1 percent of the income distribution displaying the highest ETI.
In contrast, in the model without return heterogeneity, the ETI decreases monotonically
with income.
Elasticities by Income Source To investigate this result, we start by considering the
effects of a marginal tax change on different sources of income (e.g., capital vs. labor
13Formally, we assume entrepreneurial productivity is constant and equal to average productivity in
the benchmark economy, with zr = Q/K.
income, see panels B and C of Table 4). First, with return heterogeneity, the aggregate
elasticity of capital income is positive (0.36), while it is close to zero (0.01) in the model
without return heterogeneity. In both models, the elasticity of capital income is higher
at the top of the income distribution, while it is substantially negative at the bottom
of the distribution. On the one hand, a marginal tax cut generates an accumulation of
wealth, most concentrated among high-income individuals. On the other hand, there is a
general equilibrium effect in that the higher supply of savings will reduce the borrowing
rate (see panels A and B, Table 5). This generates a negative elasticity for the bottom of
the distribution.
Comparing the two models, we see that return heterogeneity amplifies the response
of capital income at the top of the distribution. This, in turn, generates a larger general
equilibrium decrease in the borrowing rate. As a result, the elasticity of capital income
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2116
Table 4 – Effects of an Income Tax Change
No Return
Variable Benchmark Heterogeneity Difference
A. Elasticity of Taxable Income
Income Top 1% 0.77 0.37 0.41
Income Top 5% 0.62 0.40 0.22
Income Top 10% 0.60 0.43 0.17
Income Bottom 99% 0.55 0.53 0.03
Income Bottom 90% 0.70 0.59 0.11
All 0.66 0.49 0.17
B. Elasticity of Capital Income
Income Top 1% 0.94 0.78 0.16
Income Top 5% 0.74 0.76 -0.01
Income Top 10% 0.64 0.70 -0.06
Income Bottom 99% -1.76 -0.13 -1.62
Income Bottom 90% -4.02 -0.96 -3.07
All 0.36 0.01 0.35
C. Elasticity of Earnings
Income Top 1% 0.51 0.29 0.22
Income Top 5% 0.53 0.33 0.20
Income Top 10% 0.57 0.37 0.20
Income Bottom 99% 0.82 0.71 0.11
Income Bottom 90% 1.26 1.18 0.08
All 0.72 0.62 0.11
D. Capital Income Share
Income Top 1% 0.60 0.16 0.44
Income Top 5% 0.39 0.16 0.23
Income Top 10% 0.32 0.16 0.16
Income Bottom 99% 0.11 0.22 -0.11
Income Bottom 90% 0.10 0.27 -0.16
All 0.24 0.21 0.03
Note: Panels A, B and C report the income elasticities and panel D reports the capital income share.
We report the elasticities with respect to the average net of marginal tax rate. The elasticity for variable
X is defined as dX/d(1−AMTR). Earnings is total labor income, weh. Income is total taxable income.
becomes more negative at the bottom of the distribution. Furthermore, in the benchmark
model, the capital income share is around 60 percent for the top one percent, while it is
only 16 percent in the model with no return risk (see panel D, Table 4). This, combined
with more concentrated wealth and income distribution (see Appendix G), implies that
in the benchmark model, the capital income elasticity of the top one percent has a bigger
impact on the aggregate capital income elasticity as well on the overall ETI.
Second, the presence of return heterogeneity increases the elasticity of labor income
both at the aggregate level (17.1 percent) and along the whole distribution, because the
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Table 5 – Macroeconomic Effects of an Income Tax Change
No Return
Variable Benchmark Heterogeneity Difference
A. Prices
Real Wage, w 0.48 0.31 0.17
Price of Capital, p -0.86 -0.55 -0.31
Borrowing Rate, r -3.08 -1.16 -1.92
B. Aggregate Quantities
Output, Y 0.72 0.62 0.10
Quality-Adjusted Capital, Q 1.58 1.16 0.41
Capital, K 1.13 1.17 -0.04
Labor, L 0.24 0.31 -0.07
C. Productivity
Aggregate TFP 0.16 0.00 0.16
Entrepreneurial Productivity 0.45 0.00 0.45
Entrepreneurial Rate -1.87 0.00 -1.87
Note: We report the effects of a tax cut via τ0 as elasticities with respect to the average net of marginal
tax rate. The elasticity for variable X is defined as dX/d(1−AMTR).
tax cut brings about a larger increase in real wages (see panel A, Table 5). While the
strongest effect is for the top 1 percent of the income distribution (78 percent), return
heterogeneity does not change the shape of the elasticity of earnings, which due to income
effects, remains largest for the bottom of the distribution. Nevertheless, for agents in the
bottom part of the income distribution, labor earnings make up a larger part of their
income (see panel D, Table 4). Therefore, since the composition of income shifts towards
labor income (where the elasticity is higher), the elasticity for total income increases at
the bottom of the distribution.
To summarize, the combined effects of return heterogeneity on the composition of
income and its concentration, along with general equilibrium effects, explain the U-shaped
relationship between the ETI and income. Return heterogeneity increases the elasticity
of taxable income for both the top 1 percent (which display the highest response) and
the bottom 90 percent. For the top 1 percent, it amplifies the response of savings to
marginal tax changes. Moreover, the composition of income at the top shifts towards
capital, where the elasticity is relatively higher. Meanwhile, return heterogeneity also
amplifies the general equilibrium response of wages, which increases the labor income
elasticity. Furthermore, for the bottom 90 percent, the composition of income shifts more
toward labor income (where the elasticity is relatively higher), which further increases the
elasticity of total income at the bottom.
Our estimates of long-run ETIs along the distribution of taxable income comple-
ment similar empirical findings for the short-run (e.g., Mertens and Montiel Olea, 2018),
whereas the top 1 percent of the income distribution display the highest ETI. Nevertheless,
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as our estimates are for the long-run, they do not reflect any intertemporal substitution
and income shifting from transitory changes in tax policy. Furthermore, our estimates
indicate a strong real response that does not stem from tax evasion or avoidance (which
would potentially imply a even higher elasticity at the top). Our results, in particular,
show the importance of return heterogeneity for the transmission of marginal tax policies
within an estimated model consistent with the distributional characteristics of the US
economy.
Elasticities by Age and Income Next, we turn to how the elasticity of taxable
income varies by age, in addition to income. Table 6 reports the elasticity of taxable
income by age and income, in both the benchmark economy and in the alternative model
without return heterogeneity. Overall, there is a U-shaped relationship between the ETI
and age, a pattern which is further amplified by return heterogeneity. Specifically, return
heterogeneity increases the ETI from 0.59 to 0.93 for young individuals (age 21-30). For
those near retirement (age 51-64), return heterogeneity increases the ETI from 0.53 to
0.66, and generates an even larger response for retired individuals (age 65+). With
return heterogeneity, marginal tax changes generate larger responses in labor earnings,
particularly for the young and those nearing retirement. For retired individuals (age 65+),
return heterogeneity generates a larger response of capital income to tax changes.
Table 6 – Elasticities by Age and Income
Income Group
Top Top Top Bot. Bot.
Age Group 1% 5% 10% 99% 90% All
A. Benchmark Economy
Ages 21-30 0.35 0.44 0.56 0.95 1.53 0.93
Ages 31-40 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.58 0.88 0.56
Ages 41-50 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.55 0.69 0.53
Ages 51-64 0.67 0.55 0.53 0.64 0.82 0.66
Ages 65+ 1.36 1.70 2.00 -2.96 -6.56 0.73
All Ages 0.77 0.62 0.60 0.55 0.70 0.66
B. No Return Heterogeneity
Ages 21-30 0.98 0.37 0.42 0.70 0.72 0.59
Ages 31-40 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.45
Ages 41-50 0.31 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.69 0.47
Ages 51-64 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.57 0.76 0.53
Ages 65+ 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.10 -0.62 0.18
All Ages 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.49
Note: This table reports the elasticity of taxable income by age and total income. Panel A reports the
results for the benchmark economy, while panel B reports the results for the economy without return
heterogeneity.
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Return heterogeneity also affects the ETI patterns across both age and income. In our
benchmark economy, the young who are in the top 1 percent tend to be less elastic relative
to older agents in the top 1 percent. However, in the model without return heterogeneity,
this result is flipped, so that it is instead the youngest households in the top 1 percent
who are more elastic.14 Moreover, it can be seen that the overall increase in elasticities
for the young is driven by the higher elasticities for those in the bottom of the income
14It should be noted that return heterogeneity does not have much effect on the age composition of
individuals within each income group or the income composition within each age group.
Table 7 – Revenue Losses from an Income Tax Change
No Return
Group Benchmark Heterogeneity Difference
A. Total Revenue Losses
Income Top 1% 30.9 14.7 16.2
Income Top 5% 26.1 17.2 8.9
Income Top 10% 26.3 19.2 7.1
Income Bottom 99% 26.9 26.8 0.1
Income Bottom 90% 41.0 38.0 3.1
All 28.5 23.8 4.7
B. Share of Revenue Losses
Income Top 1% 45.0 15.2 29.8
Income Top 5% 64.1 41.2 22.9
Income Top 10% 78.0 60.5 17.5
Income Bottom 99% 55.0 84.8 -29.9
Income Bottom 90% 22.0 39.5 -17.5
All 100.0 100.0 0.0
Note: Panel A reports the percent of tax revenue lost to behavioral responses, given uniform change in
the income tax via τ0, by income group. Panel B reports the share of the total revenue loss which is
attributable to each income group.
distribution. Meanwhile, the overall increase in elasticities for retired individuals is driven
by the stronger response of those in the top of the income distribution.
Behavioral Revenue Losses In our framework, there is a link between the elasticity of
taxable income and the amount of additional revenue the government loses to behavioral
responses (e.g., from a tax increase). Specifically, to fix concepts, suppose the government
were to raise marginal taxes by a small amount (i.e., dτ0 > 0) and that the increase in
total tax revenue is given by dTy. Thus, there will be two effects on tax revenues. First,
there is a “mechanical” increase in tax revenues due to the fact that all taxpayers will face
a higher marginal tax rate. We denote the increase in revenues from the mechanical effect
by dM . Second, the higher tax rate will trigger a behavioral response, whereby households
reduce their average taxable income (by altering their labor supply or savings/investment
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decisions). Intuitively, when the ETI is higher, the government will lose more revenue to
the behavioral response.
In Table 7, we compute the revenue loss due to the behavioral response as the per-
centage difference between the mechanical response and the actual revenue change (i.e.,
dTy ≈ dM
⎛




See Appendix J for a derivation. The expression in (13) is a sufficient statistic to estimate
the overall revenue change from the type of tax policy reforms studied here. This indicates
that the behavioral revenue loss depends on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), as well
as the average marginal tax rate (AMTR) and the average tax rate (ATR).
Naturally, higher elasticities will be associated with higher revenue losses. Further-
more, due to the progressivity of the tax schedule, AMTR > ATR, and this will tend to
increase the behavioral losses for a given elasticity. This suggests why revenue losses are
relatively high for the bottom 90 percent. While households in the bottom 90 percent
tend to have a relatively high ETI in our benchmark economy (0.70), they do also have a
lower AMTR, which would lower the revenue losses. At the same time, the progressivity
of the tax code generates a larger gap between the AMTR and the ATR for the bottom
90 percent, pushing up their behavioral losses.
Entrepreneurial Productivity and TFP Next, we analyze the effects of marginal
income tax changes on entrepreneurial productivity and aggregate TFP (see panel C,
Table 5). In our benchmark economy with return heterogeneity, a decrease in the marginal
income tax rate reduces the entrepreneurial rate. This increases average entrepreneurial
productivity, Q/K, which further increases aggregate TFP, A = (Q/K)α. The incentive
(dM −dTy)/dM). Overall, in our benchmark economy, the government loses 28.5 percent
of additional tax revenue because of behavioral responses. Higher losses are observed
both for the top 1 percent (30.9 percent) and the bottom 90 percent (41.0 percent) of the
income distribution. These patterns are further amplified by the presence of return het-
erogeneity (as with the elasticity of taxable income). This is especially true for individuals
in the top 1 percent, where return heterogeneity more than doubles the behavioral losses
from tax changes. Furthermore, almost 80 percent of the total revenue losses come from
the behavioral responses of individuals in the top 10 percent. Nevertheless, a sizeable
fraction of losses (20 percent) come from the bottom 90 percent.
Given our policy exercise, we can derive an approximate link between the ETI and
the amount of tax revenue the government loses to behavioral responses. The marginal
change in fiscal revenues, dTy, for a marginal change in τ0, is approximately given by
to accumulate savings triggered by a marginal tax change is stronger for those agents
enjoying a high capital return (i.e., the most productive entrepreneurs). By increasing
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5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of uninsurable capital income risk for the long-run transmis-
sion mechanism of marginal tax policies. We do so by structurally estimating a life-cycle
model with uninsurable labor and capital income risk. We show that our model is suc-
cessful in capturing the right tail of the income and wealth distributions. Within this
model, we evaluate the effects of changing marginal income tax rates.
We find that return heterogeneity has strong qualitative and quantitative effects on
the transmission of fiscal policies. In particular we find that return heterogeneity strongly
increases the elasticity of income for the top 1 percent (who also display the largest
elasticity), but also increases the elasticity for the bottom 90 percent. We also find that
with return heterogeneity, a marginal tax cut re-allocates capital to high-productivity
entrepreneurs, increasing aggregate productivity.
their savings, they are able to expand the amount of capital invested in their business. As
a result, the most productive entrepreneurs get larger and attract more capital relative
to the median business. This increases average entrepreneurial productivity, and thus
aggregate TFP.15 Moreover, this also implies that some low-productivity entrepreneurs
would find it more convenient to quit their business simply lend their entire wealth to the
most productive entrepreneurs. As a result, the share of entrepreneurs decreases. Overall,
this mechanism helps generate the larger general equilibrium responses in wages, which
further increases the elasticity of taxable income.
Our results for the effects of return heterogeneity on the transmission of marginal tax
changes are interesting for at least two reasons. First, they complement a large literature
on taxation and entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2017 and Itskhoki
and Moll, 2019), as well as a literature on capital misallocation and wealth taxation (e.g.,
Guvenen et al., 2019). Second, they show the importance of wealth return heterogeneity
in explaining some well-established empirical results, such as the relation between tax
rates and entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Djankov et al., 2010), the effects of tax changes on
aggregate productivity (e.g., Cloyne, 2013) and the relationship between tax progressivity
and misallocation (e.g., Fajgelbaum et al., 2019).
15The TFP losses from misallocation in our framework is 18.5 percent, which is slightly smaller than
the losses (20 percent) reported by Guvenen et al. (2019).
Our framework could be extended in several ways. First, one could analyze how the
long-run effects of tax changes are affected by the presence of an informal sector. When
agents have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes, the effects of a tax cut should sensibly
increase. Second, it would be interesting to understand the relationship between marginal
tax changes and capital misallocation with an informal production sector. Third, it would
interesting to have a model with human capital accumulation. In the long run, lower taxes
might push more people into acquiring education, which in turn might have a beneficial
effects on entrepreneurial productivity, and income and wealth inequality.
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Appendix
A Definition of Equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium, in which capital, labor, transfers, and gov-
ernment consumption are all constant in per-capita terms. Let ψi,j(a, zh, zr) denote the
distribution of agents with type i and age j, over assets a and idiosyncratic shocks (zh, zr).
Definition 1. The stationary recursive equilibrium consists of
(i) the value function Vi,j(a, zh, zr),
(ii) the policy functions ci,j(a, zh, zr), a
′
i,j(a, zh, zr), hi,j(a, zh, zr),
(iii) the entrepreneurial profit function π(a, zr) and associated capital demand k(a, zr),
(iv) the prices (w, p, r),
(v) the per-capita stocks of capital K, intermediate good Q, labor L, lump-sum transfers
Tb, government spending G, and
(vi) the per-capital benefit levels b̄i and labor Li for types i = 1, . . . , I,
(vii) distributions (μ1, . . . , μJ), (ψi,1, . . . , ψi,J) for i = 1, . . . , I
such that
1. The value function Vi,j(a, zh, zr) solves the Bellman equation in (12) and ci,j(a, zh, zr),
a′i,j(a, zh, zr), hi,j(a, zh, zr) are the associated policy functions.
2. Household profits π(a, zr) solve (6) and capital demand k(a, zr) is given by (7).
3. The final goods producer maximizes its profits:





































[k(a, zr)− a] dψi,j = 0













for j = 1, . . . , J − 1
where μ1 is normalized so that
∑J
t=1 μj = 1.
6. The distributions of agents within each age group j and type i, ψi,1, . . . , ψi,J , for









a′i,j(a, zh, zr) = a
′} dψi,j(a, zh, zr)
where f(z′h|zh) and f(z′r|zr) are the conditional probabilities that a household will
transition to z′h and z
′
r given that its current shocks are zh and zr, respectively.
Furthermore, in the initial distribution ψi,1(a, zh, zr) for each type i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, all
age-1 agents are born with no assets (i.e., a = 0), the initial shock log zh is zero and
the initial log zr is drawn from N (0, σ
2
εr/(1− ρ2r)).
7. The government budget constraint is satisfied






μjTy (yi,j(a, zh, zr)) dψi,j
where taxable income is
yi,j(a, zh, zr) = max {wei,j(zh)hi,j(a, zh, zr) + ra(zr)a
−1
2
min (wei,j(zh)hi,j(a, zh, zr), ȳ) , 0
}

















9. The the type-specific benefit levels are b̄i = χwLi,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2116

















B Numerical Solution Technique
The numerical solution method can be summarized as follows. First, we discretize
the AR(1) processes for the idiosyncratic shocks (zh, zr) using the Rouwenhorst method
(see Kopecky and Suen, 2010). Second, to solve for the stationary equilibrium, we define
the vector function fk
(
r, χ,Q, Tb, {Li}Ii=1
)
for k = 1, . . . , 4 + I (see below for a defini-
tion). We then utilize a multi-dimensional root-finding algorithm to solve for the vector(
r, χ,Q, Tb, {Li}Ii=1
)
such that fk = 0 for k = 1, . . . , 4 + I. For a given guess for the for
the vector
(
r, χ,Q, Tb, {Li}Ii=1
)
, we proceed to compute fk for k = 1, . . . , 4 + I as follows:
1. Given {Li}Ii=1, compute aggregate labor L =
∑I
i=1 πiLi.
2. Given Q and L, determine prices p = F1(Q,L) and w = F2(Q,L).
3. Given χ, w and Li, determine the social security benefit bi,j = χwLi × 1{j ≥ R}.
4. Given w, r, p, bi,j, Tb, solve for the policy functions a
′
i,j(a, zh, zr), hi,j(a, zh, zr) for
i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J by iterating on the Bellman equation defined in (12).
5. Calculate the distributions ψi,j for i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , ψJ using Monte Carlo
simulation.
6. Given ψi,j and
(
r, χ,Q, Tb, {Li}Ii=1
)
























































ei,j(zh)hi,j(a, zh, zr)dψi,j for i = 1, . . . , I
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C Survival Probabilities
The survival probabilities were obtained from the 2016 Period Life Tables from United
States Mortality Database (see Table C.1). We utilized survival probabilities for both
genders across the entire United States. Since the maximum age is J = 85 in the model
(which corresponds to age 105 in real life), we impose that sJ+1 = 0.
Table C.1 – Survival Probabilities
Age (j) sj+1 Age (j) sj+1 Age (j) sj+1
1 0.9990 31 0.9956 61 0.9483
2 0.9990 32 0.9951 62 0.9437
3 0.9990 33 0.9946 63 0.9373
4 0.9989 34 0.9942 64 0.9313
5 0.9989 35 0.9937 65 0.9251
6 0.9989 36 0.9933 66 0.9161
7 0.9988 37 0.9926 67 0.9065
8 0.9987 38 0.9921 68 0.8954
9 0.9988 39 0.9914 69 0.8826
10 0.9987 40 0.9910 70 0.8694
11 0.9986 41 0.9903 71 0.8543
12 0.9986 42 0.9895 72 0.8394
13 0.9986 43 0.9889 73 0.8226
14 0.9985 44 0.9880 74 0.8051
15 0.9984 45 0.9873 75 0.7920
16 0.9984 46 0.9867 76 0.7736
17 0.9983 47 0.9855 77 0.7543
18 0.9982 48 0.9845 78 0.7344
19 0.9981 49 0.9821 79 0.7139
20 0.9981 50 0.9826 80 0.6932
21 0.9980 51 0.9799 81 0.6720
22 0.9979 52 0.9780 82 0.6506
23 0.9977 53 0.9751 83 0.6299
24 0.9975 54 0.9738 84 0.6096
25 0.9973 55 0.9710 85 0
26 0.9971 56 0.9688
27 0.9970 57 0.9654
28 0.9966 58 0.9620
29 0.9963 59 0.9582
30 0.9959 60 0.9534
D Tax Function Estimation
We use the 2016 wave of Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to estimate the param-
eters of tax function, given in Equation (11). Our measure of total household income
follows closely Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and includes all income flows accruing to
households. In particular, it includes salaries and wages, both taxable and non-taxable
income, dividend and interest income, capital gains, total pensions and annuities received
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(including taxable IRA distributions), unemployment compensation and social security
benefits, and alimony received. To calculate federal income tax liabilities, we use NBER’s
TAXSIM program. Our notion of tax liability includes capital gains rates, surtaxes, AMT
as well as refundable and non-refundable credits. In our estimation, we restrict the sam-
ple to those households whose income is strictly positive and whose measured average tax
rate is less than 100%.
E Estimation of Ability Process from PSID
To estimate the parameters (ρh, σεh) of the labor ability process, we follow the approach
of Kaplan (2012). Specifically, we utilize the the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
using data from the 1968-2017 waves. We use selection criteria similar to Kaplan (2012),
where we (i) retain only the core Survey Research Center (SRC) subsample, (ii) keep
only males, (iii) drop observations with missing data on years of education, (iv) keep
only individuals aged between 21 and 64, (v) drop households with a second earner who
earned at least half the amount earned by the male head, (vi) keep only individuals who
worked between 520 and 5200 hours during the calendar year, (vii) drop observations
where the nominal wage is less than 1 dollar, (viii) drop observations where real income is
below 1,500 (in 2010 dollars, deflated using the CPI). The final sample contains 62,683
individual/year observations and 7,510 distinct individuals.
We measure the household’s real earnings as the head of household’s labor income,
deflated by the CPI. We divide real earnings by the head of household’s yearly hours to
obtain a measure of “ability” (i.e., real wages). First, we regress log ability on a full set
of year and race dummies. Let log ei,j be the residual from this regression for individual
Table E.1 – Parameter Estimates of Ability Process from PSID




Note: This table reports the parameter estimates for the ability process from PSID, which are obtained
using GMM. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are obtained by bootstrap with 250 repetitions.
i at age j. The benchmark specification for the statistical process governing log ei,j is
log ei,j = κj + ēi + zh,j + εe,j
zh,j = ρhzh,j−1 + εh,j
zh,1 = 0
where E[εh,j] = E[ēi] = 0, Var(εh,j) = σ
2
εh, Var(ēi) = σ
2
e and Var(εe,j) = σ
2
εe. This specifi-
cation matches our benchmark specification for labor ability given by Equation (2) and (3)
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in the text, with the exception that we allow for i.i.d. measurement error, εe,j. For nota-
tional convenience, we have slightly altered the notation here, where i indexes individual







/ [1− ρ2h] and Cov(zh,j, zh,j+s) = ρshVar(zh,j) for s > 0. De-
note an element of the autocovariance function of log ei,j as σj,j+s ≡ Cov(log ei,j, log ei,j+s).
















σ2εh for s > 0.
Note that these moments are independent of the age profile, κj. We construct estimates of
these autocovariances by age and year. We use a maximum of 25 lags and retain moments
that were constructed with at least 30 observations. We assume that the variance of the
i.i.d. measurement error is σ2εe = 0.03, using the estimates of measurement error of earnings
and hours in Kaplan (2012).
We use generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the parameters of this
process. Denote the parameters to be estimated by Θ = (ρh, σεh, σe). The GMM estimator











Note: This table reports the resulting wealth returns by wealth percentile in the model and the data.
For the data, we estimate the average return for each household’s portfolio in the SCF using estimates
of the average returns of different asset types between 1990 and 2016, as reported by Xavier (2020).










where M̂ is the vector targeted moments in PSID, and m̂(Θ) are the corresponding model
moments, and W is a weighting matrix. We assumed the off-diagonal elements of the
weighting matrix W were zero. For the diagonal elements, we assumed Wii =
√
ni, where
ni is the number of observations used in the construction of moment i. To minimize the
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GMM criterion, we used a scatter-search algorithm which generates random start points
for the interior-point minimization algorithm. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap
with 250 repetitions. The resulting parameter estimates are reported in Table E.1.
F Calculating Return Profiles in SCF
Here we describe the technique used to estimate the return on wealth at household
level in the SCF. We define rj and ζj to be the return of asset type j and its share in each






16The j categories are: interest earning assets, stocks, private businesses, real estate, other financial
and non financial assets and debt (with a negative sign).
The return rj of each asset type is composed of its yield (income generated by the asset)
and its capital gain (price changes in the asset). For each asset type, we obtain the
average return over the period 1990-2016 from Xavier (2020). Finally, we compute the
household’s portfolio shares ζj directly in the 2016 SCF.
In Table F.1, we report the resulting returns by wealth percentile in the 2016 SCF. The
data display the same qualitative patterns as that of our model: households with higher
wealth obtain higher than average returns. Moreover, our model implied-returns at the
bottom 25 percent of the wealth distribution and the top 1 percent are quite close to the
imputed returns in the SCF. In the middle of the distribution, imputed returns from the
SCF seem to be higher than those implied by the model. Overall these results (particularly
for the consistency at the top of the wealth distribution) confirm the ability of our model
to provide a realistic explanation of the fat tail in wealth and income distributions.
G Model with No Return Heterogeneity
Table G.1 reports how the targeted moments in our model change when we eliminate
return heterogeneity. All other parameters are kept as in the benchmark model. Overall,
wealth is much less concentrated, as the wealth gini falls from 0.862 to 0.706, and the top
1 percent wealth share falls from 0.406 to 0.172. As a result, tax revenues also become less
concentrated, with the share of tax revenues paid by the top 1 percent of income falling
from 0.419 to 0.247. Hours of work fall from 0.299 to 0.238. Furthermore, absent capital
income risk, aggregate wealth-income ratio increases sensibly to 3.81 and the borrowing
rate increases to 4.5 percent. This is because everyone runs a business in this alternative
model. As such, capital demand is higher than in the benchmark and more evenly spread
across the distribution. Higher capital demand also implies higher borrowing costs.
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H Model with Separate Capital and Labor Taxes
In our benchmark economy, both capital and labor income are taxed jointly, which is
consistent with the US tax code and the empirical literature. In this section, we consider
the implications for our results if labor income and capital income our taxed separately.





The total labor income tax is then given by Ty(y), given by Equation (11) in the text. We
assume this function has the same parameters as our benchmark economy. Households
separately pay a flat tax on capital income, given by τkra(zr)a. We set τk so that total tax
revenue is identical to the revenue in our benchmark economy. This requires τk = 0.226.
Since capital and labor are now taxed at separate rates, we cannot compute an elas-
ticity of taxable income for total income. Therefore, we separately define an elasticity of
labor income and an elasticity of capital income, where each elasticity is defined relative
to the relevant net-of-marginal tax rate. We then consider the effects of a change in the
labor income tax rate (i.e., a change in τ0), a change in the capital income tax rate (τk)
Table G.1 – Targeted Moments, Benchmark Model vs. No Return Heterogeneity
Moments Benchmark Data No Return Het.
Capital-to-output Ratio 2.95 2.95 3.81
Investment-to-output Ratio 0.22 0.22 0.27
Borrowing Rate 0.019 0.019 0.045
Average Hours (working age) 0.299 0.304 0.238
Entrepreneurship Rate 0.087 0.087 -
Wealth Gini 0.862 0.860 0.706
Wealth Share, Top 1% 0.406 0.386 0.172
Wealth Share, Top 5% 0.638 0.651 0.406
Wealth Share, Top 20% 0.888 0.883 0.725
Earnings Gini 0.735 0.680 0.734
Earnings Share, Top 1% 0.145 0.172 0.146
Earnings Share, Top 5% 0.363 0.327 0.362
Earnings Share, Top 20% 0.687 0.605 0.691
Average Earnings 54.83 55.30 54.81
Revenues Tax Share, Top 1% 0.419 0.424 0.247
Revenues Tax Share, Top 5% 0.702 0.659 0.571
Revenues Tax Share, Top 20% 0.959 0.881 0.914
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 20% 1.574 1.638 1.661
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 40% 0.915 0.959 1.102
Wealth-Income Slope, Top 60% 0.693 0.717 0.635
Note: This table reports the moments in the benchmark model and the data and compares it with a
model without return heterogeneity.
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and a change in both tax rates. Table H.1 reports the resulting elasticities for labor and
capital income. Table H.2 reports the resulting elasticities for the model with no return
heterogeneity. Overall, we see that our main results survive. The elasticity of taxable
labor income is higher for people in the bottom of the total income distribution, while
Table H.1 – Elasticities with Separate Capital and Labor Taxation
Benchmark Separate Taxation
Income Labor Capital Cap. & Lab.
Variable Tax Change Tax Change Tax Change Tax Change
A. Capital Income
Income Top 1% 0.94 0.72 0.65
Income Top 5% 0.74 0.50 0.50
Income Top 10% 0.64 0.41 0.41
Income Bottom 99% -1.76 -1.49 -1.08
Income Bottom 90% -4.02 -1.82 -1.41
All 0.36 0.12 0.18
B. Labor Income
Income Top 1% 0.51 0.15 0.52
Income Top 5% 0.53 0.19 0.55
Income Top 10% 0.57 0.24 0.58
Income Bottom 99% 0.82 0.39 0.84
Income Bottom 90% 1.26 0.63 1.30
All 0.72 0.34 0.77
Note: This table reports the elasticities of taxable labor income and capital income in a model with
separate capital and labor taxation. For both labor and capital income, we group individuals based on
their position in the total income distribution.
the elasticity of taxable capital income is higher for people in the top of the total income
distribution.
I Alternative Policy Reform
Here were consider an alternative policy reform where we increase income taxes only
for individuals in the top 1 percent. Specifically, we assume households face a modified
income tax function, T̂y(y), given by:
T̂y(y) =
{
Ty(y) if y < ŷ
Ty(ŷ + τ̂ (y − ŷ) if y ≥ ŷ
For income below a threshold ŷ, the household’s income tax is given by Ty(y), as in our
benchmark economy. For income above ŷ, households face a flat marginal tax, τ̂ . We
choose the threshold ŷ so that the marginal tax rate τ̂ applies to the top 1 percent of
households and set τ̂ = T ′y (ŷ).
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Table H.2 – No Return Heterogeneity with Separate Capital and Labor Taxation
Joint Tax. Separate Taxation
Income Labor Capital Cap. & Lab.
Variable Tax Change Tax Change Tax Change Tax Change
A. Capital Income
Income Top 1% 0.78 -0.39 0.20
Income Top 5% 0.76 -0.43 0.17
Income Top 10% 0.70 -0.39 0.12
Income Bottom 99% -0.13 -0.19 -0.16
Income Bottom 90% -0.96 -0.08 -0.30
All 0.01 -0.22 -0.11
B. Labor Income
Income Top 1% 0.29 0.21 0.40
Income Top 5% 0.33 0.26 0.44
Income Top 10% 0.37 0.30 0.48
Income Bottom 99% 0.71 0.48 0.71
Income Bottom 90% 1.18 0.75 1.03
All 0.62 0.43 0.64
Note: This table reports the elasticities of taxable labor income and capital income in a model with
separate capital and labor taxation and no return heterogeneity. For both labor and capital income, we
group individuals based on their position in the total income distribution.
Table I.1 – Effects of Income Tax Increase for Top 1%
Alternative No Return
Variable Benchmark Heterogeneity Difference
A. Elasticity of Taxable Income
Income Top 1% 0.83 0.44 0.38
All 1.00 0.58 0.42
B. Revenue Losses
Income Top 1% 51.0 41.8 9.2
All 53.9 36.0 17.9
Note: This table reports the results of the policy experiment where the top marginal tax rate is increased
only for individuals in the top 1 percent of the income distribution.
We consider a policy reform in which the top marginal tax rate τ̂ is increased by
1 percentage point. Compared to our main policy experiment in which income taxes
were changed for all taxpayers, we see that this policy reform is more distortionary.
The elasticity of taxable income, for the top 1 percent and overall, is higher in this
economy relative to our main policy experiment (see panel A, Table I.1). Similarly, the
behavioral revenue losses are also higher, where the government would lose a little more
than half of the additional tax revenue to the behavioral response (see panel B, Table I.1).
Furthermore, as in our main policy experiment, these results are amplified by the presence
of return heterogeneity.
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J ETI and Revenue Loss
In this section, we derive an approximate relationship between the elasticity of taxable
income and the behavioral revenue losses. Specifically, denote the tax function Ty(y) =
τ0T̄y(y), where T̄y(y) = y
(
1− (τ2yτ1 + 1)−1/τ1
)
. Let Γ(y) be the equilibrium distribution
of agents over taxable income y. Γ can refer to the entire distribution, or to subsets of the
entire distribution (e.g., top 1 percent, top 5 percent, etc.). Let Ty denote the aggregate


















The first term is the mechanical effect, or the marginal increase in tax revenue absent any
changes in taxable income. The second term is the behavioral response, which captures the
effect of a marginal change in income on aggregate tax revenue. Let T̄y =
∫
T̄y(y)dΓ(y) be
normalized tax revenue and Y =
∫
ydΓ(y) denote aggregate taxable income. To simplify









dΓ(y) is the normalized average marginal tax rate. We also as-
sume that AMTR is roughly constant for a small change in τ0.Essentially, we are assuming
that the marginal change in aggregate normalized tax revenue, T̄y, is approximately equal
to the marginal change in aggregate income Y times the normalized average marginal tax
rate, AMTR. This will approximately be true when most of the higher-income individu-
als within the distribution Γ face a similar marginal tax rate. This would also be true if
the marginal tax rate function, T ′y (y), could be approximated by an increasing sequence
of constant marginal tax rates (e.g., consistent with the US tax code).
Substituting Equation (J.3) into Equation (J.2), we get:
dTy
dτ0




Let AMTR = τ0AMTR =
∫ T ′y(y)y
Y
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For a small tax change dτ0, the mechanical effect is dM = T̄ydτ0 and the marginal change










This is Equation (13) in the text.
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